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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Miami, Florida, 1981. Sun-drenched, sandy beaches became
the center of stormy controversy as waves of Haitian immigrants
debarked at Florida's shoreline. The Krome Avenue detention fa-
cility in Miami became as familiar a landmark to South Floridians
as the Fontainebleau Hotel on Miami Beach. The migration of
Haitians to South Florida was not a new occurrence. Undocu-
mented Haitians, sailing in "small boats barely suited to ocean
travel,"1 had been arriving since December, 1972.2
By the summer of 1981, more than 35,000 undocumented Hai-
tians had reached Florida.3 Between 1972 and 1981, the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service (INS) consistently admitted un-
documented Haitian aliens. Generally, the INS granted parole;5
1. Jean v. Nelson, No. 82-5772, slip op. at 2780 (11th Cir. Apr. 12, 1983), petition for
reh'g and suggestion for reh'g en banc filed May 10, 1983.
2. Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973, 978 (S.D. Fla. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
and remanded sub nom. Jean v. Nelson, No. 82-5772 (11th Cir. Apr. 12, 1983).
3. Jean v. Nelson, slip op. at 2780. The United States Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit noted the Haitians "came to America seeking relief from economic oppression,
as the government would have it, or to escape political oppression, as plaintiffs assert." Id.
4. Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. at 978-79.
It is highly likely that INS' inaction [maintaining a parole and work author-
ization policy rather than initiating a detention policy] provided the greatest
inducement to the ultimate swollen tide of incoming, undocumented Haitians.
Record material suggests that a large percentage of the aliens bought passage to
the United States from promoters in Haiti whose best sales pitch was the large
number of the prospect's countrymen who, without visas or other documents,
had reached Florida and were residing there undisturbed. Protestations by INS
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detention of aliens awaiting hearings was "rare."' The INS had
agreed with the National Council of Churches in 1977 that illegal
Haitian entrants were to be detained only briefly for medical
screenings and then released to available sponsors and given work
authorizations pending their exclusion hearings.7 That general pa-
role agreement terminated in May, 1981.8
The evidence shows that prior to May 20, 1981, Haitian ref-
ugees arriving in this country, for whom the INS initiated exclu-
sion proceedings, were detained for a brief period of time neces-
sary for routine public health screening and released on parole
into the community to relatives or voluntary agencies willing to
act as sponsors. This "policy" abruptly changed sometime be-
tween May 20, 1981 and July 31, 1981; and a policy of detention
was initiated.9
The INS changed its parole policy because of the influx in
1980 of Cuban and Haitian immigrants.1" The Mariel boatlift"
transported more than 125,000 Cubans to the United States during
the spring of 1980-while INS officials looked on, unable to control
this "Freedom Flotilla."'" Responding in February, 1981 to this
of the illegality of such operations could hardly be expected to prevail against
the proprietary reasoning that Haitians who reached southern Florida were liv-
ing, working and earning in the United States.
Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1029 n.11 (5th Cir. 1982).
5. Jean v. Nelson, slip op. at 2786. Detention was "limited to those aliens who were
likely to abscond, or who posed a threat to the national security." Id.
6. Id.
7. Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. at 978.
Parole of aliens pending an exclusion hearing is a relatively recent phenome-
non. Prior to 1954, it was INS policy to detain almost all aliens at the port of
entry pending a determination of their admissibility .... Large detention cen-
ters existed for this purpose at San Francisco, California and Ellis Island, New
York. In 1954, however, the new commissioner of the INS . . . decided that this
policy of mass detention was inhumane and unnecessary .... At that time the
policy changed, and aliens were paroled freely into the United States pending a
determination of admissibility.
Slip op. at 2786.
8. Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. at 978.
9. Id. at 981; see infra notes 10-17 and accompanying text.
10. "By almost all accounts it was mass immigration of Cubans that prompted tighten-
ing the net in which the Haitians were caught." Slip op. at 2780 n.3.
11. In April 1980, more than 10,000 Cubans sought refuge in the Peruvian Embassy in
Havana, Cuba. Within a few days, boats from South Florida journeyed to Cuba's Mariel
Harbor to bring those Cubans and many others to America. Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. at
978.
12. Id. "Once the 'Freedom Flotilla' started, nothing could be done except to allow the
Cubans to arrive and then formulate, on a post hoc basis, a plan to process and resettle
them." Id. at 978-79.
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sudden immigration, the Carter administration "established a 'Cu-
ban/Haitian' entrant status." The government promoted efforts to
resettle those Cubans who had arrived in the United States be-
tween April 21 and June 20, 1980 and those Haitians who had ar-
rived prior to June 20, 1980.'
In March, 1981, two months after he took office, President
Reagan created a special task force to consider the continuing ille-
gal immigration problem.1' The task force, headed by Attorney
General William French Smith, recommended detaining aliens
without parole pending a determination of their right to enter the
country. Significantly, the government "had not resorted to wide-
spread detention of undocumented aliens since 1954."''
President Reagan approved the recommendations of the task
force" and publicly stated on July 30, 1981, that there was a need
to control immigration.'7 The President said the Attorney General
would take administrative actions and propose legislation to
achieve this control.18 Attorney General Smith immediately ap-
peared before two congressional subcommittees on immigration,
but he did not propose legislation at that time.19 Instead, the At-
torney General reiterated the conclusion of the task force: there
was a "necessity of detaining illegal aliens pending exclusion."20
The INS, on an unascertainable date in 1981, implemented a pol-
icy of detaining Haitian aliens in prisons or camps such as the
Krome Avenue detention facility. For some Haitians detention
lasted more than one year.21
II. A CHRONICLE OF THE CASE
This is a complicated case. The issues presented are com-
plex. And, it is an involved case. The record on appeal is volumi-
13. Id. at 979. The district court noted that, under the Carter administration's policy,
"local communities were left with the task of providing jobs, housing, health care and food
for the approximately 150,000 new residents of South Florida. This burden taxed local re-
sources to their limits .... " Id.
14. Id. Members of the task force included the attorney general and the cabinet officers
in charge of the Departments of State, Defense, Transportation, Labor, Commerce, Health
and Human Services, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. Id.
15. Slip op. at 2781. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
16. Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. at 980.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. The administration's immigration bill was introduced in Congress on October
22, 1981. See infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
20. 544 F. Supp. at 980.
21. Id. at 983-84; Jean v. Nelson, slip op. at 2778-79.
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nous. It is a delicate matter as well: the court below noted the
extensive publicity this case has received, and the strong feelings
with which it is regarded by either side.2
Between June 1 and June 5, 1981, the INS conducted mass
exclusion hearings for Haitian immigrants. "Many hearings were
held behind locked doors in courtrooms from which counsel at-
tempting to inform the Haitians of their rights were barred. Over-
whelming evidence established that Creole translators were so in-
adequate that Haitians could not understand the proceedings nor
be informed of their rights."2 Marie Lucie Jean, Lucien Louis, and
Herold Jacques, all Haitian aliens, arrived in South Florida on or
after May 20, 1981. The timing of their arrival coincided with the
new administration's changing immigration policy. Upon applying
for entry into the United States, they were detained and subse-
quently ordered excluded, pursuant to the INS's new policy of "ac-
celerated exclusion proceedings and detention without parole for
all Haitian refugees. 2 4
On June 10, 1981 Marie Lucie Jean and Herold Jacques, on
behalf of themselves and other Haitian aliens similarly situated,
and the Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. (HRC)15 petitioned the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
for a writ of habeas corpus20 The petitioners sought to stay the
INS's final orders of exclusion against them and approximately
eighty-three other Haitian aliens.2 7 Petitioners later filed an
amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus and a class action
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The class included Hai-
tians who had received final orders of exclusion and deportation
22. Jean v. Nelson, slip op. at 2778.
23. Id.
24. Brief for Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 2, Jean v. Nelson, No. 82-5772 (11th Cir.
Apr. 12, 1983).
25. Plaintiff, Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. (HRC) is a Florida nonprofit corporation.
The purpose of HRC is to "promote the well-being of Haitian Refugees through appropriate
programs and activities" including but not limited to legal representation. The bylaws of
HRC state that the membership consists of "the Haitian Refugee Community in Florida
and members of the community at large who have shown support and interest for the de-
fined purposes and activities of the corporation." Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. at 984 n.28.
26. If an alien loses in an exclusion hearing before an immigration law judge, the alien
has the right to seek review of the exclusion decision before the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals. If the appeal is unsuccessful, the alien may seek review of the exclusion order by filing
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court. Id. at 978.
27. Emergency Habeas Corpus Petition to Stay Final Orders of Deportation Against
Certain Haitian Refugees Issued by the Immigration and Naturalization Service at 1, Jean
v. Meissner, No. 81-1260-CIV-ALH (S.D. Fla. June 10, 1981).
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between June 1 and June 5, 1981, as well as those Haitians who
were detained without parole pending exclusion proceedings.
The complaint challenged INS practices and procedures used
in processing the Haitians for exclusion.28 The plaintiffs alleged,
inter alia, that (1) the INS had not complied with the Administra-
28. The complaint included the following grounds for relief:
(1) that the Defendant officials of INS District VI and their employees con-
ducted preliminary interviews ... in which the refugees were compelled to ap-
pear in person before INS representatives without being permitted to be accom-
panied, represented, and advised by counsel, and without being advised of their
right to do so, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5
U.S.C. § 555(b); (2) that on or about May 20, 1981, Defendants changed their
prior policy with respect to the parole and detention of Haitian refugees arriving
after that date, the order in which such refugees would be subjected to exclusion
proceedings would be conducted, a change in policy which is unlawful since not
accomplished in accordance with the rulemaking requirements of the APA, 5
U.S.C. § 553; (3) that Defendants failed to provide Petitioners with adequate
notice of their right to counsel at exclusion hearings and of their right to a hear-
ing [and] . . . failed to give Petitioners written notice of the purposes for their
detention and hearing ... in violation of INS Operations Instruction ... § 292
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1362, [and] the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment ... ; (4) that Defendants denied Petitioners
... access to counsel in connection with their exclusion proceedings, in violation
of... the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the First Amendment
... and in violation of Plaintiff Haitian Refugee Center, Inc.'s rights under the
First Amendment; (5) that Defendants denied petitioners . .. their right to a
public exclusion hearing ... ; (6) that Defendants denied Petitioners ... their
right to apply for political asylum ... and (7) that Defendants have applied a
double standard regarding the exclusion of aliens, subjecting Haitian refugees
but not other refugee groups to the above policies and procedures, resulting in
discrimination and threatened discrimination based on race and national origin
in violation of the equal protection requirements of the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment ....
Louis v. Meissner, 532 F. Supp. 881, 883-84 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
Plaintiffs removed two parties named in the first complaint-Marie Lucie Jean and
Herold Jacques-and named six Haitian aliens in addition to Lucien Louis because
On or about August 10, 1981, [the district court] granted defendants' mo-
tion to vacate petitioners' final orders of exclusion and to remand [to] the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service. As a result, the class designated as "petition-
ers" in the Complaint, and defined as refugees for whom final orders of exclusion
and deportation have been issued, is non-existent and has been absorbed into
the class designated as "plaintiffs" in the Complaint, and defined as refugees
who have not as yet been issued final orders of exclusion and deportation.
Supplemental Pleading and Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and
Mandatory Relief-Class Action at 1, Louis v. Meissner, No. 81-1260-CIV-ALH (S.D. Fla.
Aug. 24, 1981).
The amended complaint stated that Lucien Louis, one of the original petitioners, was
released on parole into the community after testifying on June 29, 1981. But Louis was
retained as a party to this action because (1) he was subjected to preliminary interviews
without counsel; (2) he was subject to having his parole revoked at any time; and therefore,
(3) he was subject to being detained again. Id. at 2. See also 532 F. Supp. at 884.
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tive Procedure Act's (APA) rulemaking requirements before imple-
menting the new detention policy; (2) the INS violated the fifth
amendment by enforcing its new policy in a discriminatory man-
ner; and (3) the INS denied HRC's first amendment right of access
to the Haitians and the Haitians' access rights to friends, family,
and counsel.2 Plaintiffs sought declaratory relief regarding the va-
lidity of their claims, an injunction against the enforcement of
INS's new detention policy, a stay of deportation for any Haitian
excluded under the new policy, and a stay of exclusion hearings for
Haitians unrepresented by counsel.30
A. The District Court Decisions"'
On September 30, 1981, in a "strongly worded opinion, '32 the
district court granted plaintiffs' motions for class certification and
a preliminary injunction against deportation of class members."3
29. Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. at 983 n.25.
30. Slip op. at 2779.
31. Numerous lawsuits challenged the disparate treatment of Haitian immigrants. The
INS had required Haitian aliens to assert their claims for political asylum in exclusion hear-
ings rather than in the customary deportation hearings. Sannon v. United States, 427 F.
Supp. 1270 (S.D. Fla. 1977), vacated and remanded without opinion, 566 F.2d 104 (5th
Cir.), vacated as moot, 631 F.2d 1247 (5th Cir. 1978). The INS had also delayed the issuance
of work authorizations for Haitians. National Council of Churches v. Egan, No. 79-2959-
CIV-WMH (S.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 1979). The expedited procedure for processing Haitian claims
for political asylum was the subject of another suit. Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503
F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980), afl'd as modified sub nom. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith,
676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982). In Louis v. Meissner, 530 F. Supp. 924 (S.D. Fla. 1981),
Haitian immigrants sought access to counsel and fair hearings and protection from errone-
ous deportation.
32. Slip op. at 2779.
33. In his order granting the temporary restraining order (which subsequently was con-
verted into a preliminary injunction, 530 F. Supp. at 930), Judge Hastings described at
length how the INS had been playing a "human shell game" with the Haitians. The INS
had transferred members of plaintiffs' class from the Krome Avenue detention facility in
Miami to detention facilities located in Puerto Rico, West Virginia, Texas, and New York.
Having made a long and perilous journey on the seas to Southern Florida,
these refugees, seeking the promised land, have instead been subjected to a
human shell game in which the arbitrary Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice has sought to scatter them to locations that, with the exception of Brooklyn
are all in desolate, remote, hostile, culturally diverse areas, containing a paucity
of available legal support and few, if any, Creole interpreters. In this regard, INS
officials have acted as haphazard as the rolling seas that brought these boat peo-
ple to this great country's shores .... These refugees were removed from Miami,
a city with a substantial immigration bar as well as volunteer lawyers from vari-
ous organizations expressing an interest in representing these refugees. Miami
also has a large Haitian population, and as a result, many Creole speaking indi-
viduals able to serve as translators to facilitate the attorney/client relationship,
as well as community support groups and family members able to assist these
1010 [Vol. 36:1005
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District Court Judge Alcee Hastings3' certified the class of Haitian
aliens who had "arrived in the Southen District of Florida on or
after May 20, 1981, who are applying for entry into the U.S. and
who are presently held in detention pending exclusion proceedings
at various INS detention facilities, for whom an order of exclusion
has not been entered and who are unrepresented by counsel. '3 5
The court also found fault with the closed-door proceedings in
which eleven Haitians were ordered deported. The government
later acknowledged that the mass exclusion hearings, at which the
Haitians had neither legal representation nor adequate translators,
were improper.8 6 The government did not appeal the preliminary
injunction. Instead, it requested an immediate trial.3 7
On February 24, 1982, District Court Judge Eugene Spellman
modified the class to include Haitians represented by attorneys.3 ,
In a matter of weeks, the Dade County Bar Association recruited
refugees in their exclusion proceedings. From this relatively advantageous loca-
tion from the prospective of the refugees, INS has distributed them to remote
areas lacking attorneys with experience in immigration law, or for that matter,
any attorneys at all willing to represent them.
Louis v. Meissner, 530 F. Supp. 924, 926 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
In July, 1981, the State of Florida brought suit against the federal government because
the Krome Avenue detention facility was overcrowded. The government told the court that
it would try to keep the population at Krome below 1,000 persons. Therefore, the INS had
to transfer Haitians to other detention facilities throughout the country whenever Krome's
population exceeded 1,000 detainees. Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. at 983. The district court
determined these transfers were necessary to comply with the government's representations
in the suit brought by Florida. See Graham v. Smith, No. 81-1497-CIV-JE (S.D. Fla. 1981).
The court concluded that these transfers were not intended to deny plaintiffs' access to
counsel, nor were they intended to discriminate against them. Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp.
at 983 n.27. By June, 1982, approximately 2,100 class members were detained at various
detention facilities. Id. at 984.
34. This case was heard by Judge Alcee Hastings until December 3, 1981, when it was
transferred to Judge Eugene Spellman. Louis v. Meissner, 532 F. Supp. at 883 n.1 (1982).
35. Louis v. Meissner, 530 F. Supp. at 930 (1981) (original emphasis omitted; emphasis
supplied).
36. Id. at 928.
37. Jean v. Nelson, slip op. at 2779.
38. The Class consists of all Haitian aliens who have arrived in the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida on or after May 20, 1981, who are applying for entry into the
United States and who are presently in detention pending exclusion proceedings
at various INS detention facilities, for whom an order of exclusion has not been
entered and who are either: (1) unrepresented by counsel; or (2) represented by
counsel pro bono publico assigned by the Haitian Refugee Volunteer Lawyer
Task Force of the Dade County Bar Association.
Louis v. Meissner, 532 F. Supp. at 884. Judge Spellman modified Judge Hastings's orders
certifying the class and enjoining the defendants from holding exclusion hearings because of
legal and factual developments that occurred subsequent to the entry of Judge Hastings's
orders.
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more than 300 attorneys to represent the plaintiffs. 9 Thereafter,
the government could conduct exclusion hearings for class mem-
bers represented by counsel but was enjoined from holding any ex-
clusion proceedings for unrepresented class members until their
claims were resolved.40
On June 18, 1982, following a six-week trial, the district court
announced its findings of fact and conclusions of law.41 Its final
judgment followed on June 29th.42 The court declared the new de-
tention policy "null and void" and restored to "full force and ef-
fect" the parole policy that existed prior to May 20, 1981 .4 The
district court ordered the government to release the Haitians, 4 in-
cluding the more than one thousand held at the Krome Avenue
detention facility.
The plaintiffs prevailed on their claim that the INS had vio-
lated the rulemaking procedures of the APA. "[W]hen the Govern-
ment changed its long-standing policy of freely paroling Haitians
to a policy of incarcerating them while they litigate their claims for
admission to this country, it did so in a procedurally improper
way."'45 The court entered final judgment in favor of the govern-
ment on the fifth amendment discrimination claim. The district
court stated that the new immigration policy "was not well
planned or executed and consequently it sometimes appeared to be
arbitrary or inconsistent." 46 Nevertheless, the district court con-
cluded that the plaintiffs had failed to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that they were detained because of their race or
39. [Sjubsequent to the transfer, the Dade County Bar Association has made a
significant and historic effort to obtain attorneys to represent indigent Haitian
nationals, many of whom have been incarcerated at the Krome Detention Facil-
ity for over six months. In a matter of weeks, the Dade County Bar Association
has been successful in obtaining over three hundred lawyers to represent the
indigent Haitians so that their hearings may proceed and they may obtain some
form of resolution of their asylum claims to remain in the United States.
Id. at 884-85 n.6. Prior to the modification, the class included only unrepresented Haitians.
"To leave the class in that status would have placed the Haitians in detention in the situa-
tion of choosing between having counsel or having the protection of this Court's injunction,
and any relief that may ultimately be obtained from this lawsuit." Id. at 885 n.6.
40. Id. at 885.
41. Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Fla. 1982), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, .and
remanded sub nom. Jean v. Nelson, No. 82-5772 (11th Cir. Apr. 12, 1983).
42. Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. Fla. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and
remanded sub nom. Jean v. Nelson, No. 82-5772 (11th Cir. Apr. 12, 1983).
43. Id. at 1006.
44. Id. The court set forth an interim plan for release of the detained Haitians; see id.
at 1007-09.
45. 544 F. Supp. at 1004.
46. Id. at 1002.
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origin: "[tihey were excludable aliens unable to establish a prima
facie claim for admission and. . . non-Haitians were detained pur-
suant to this policy as well."'47 The release order mooted the first
amendment right of access claim. 8
B. The Eleventh Circuit Decision
On July 13, 1982, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit denied the government's motion for a partial stay
of the final judgment.49 The government then appealed the district
court's ruling that the new detention policy was null and void. The
Haitians cross-appealed on the discrimination and right of access
issues, as well as the district court's dismissal of the procedural
claims. 50 The Eleventh Circuit heard oral argument on this expe-
dited appeal on September 1, 1982. More than seven months later,
on April 12, 1983, the Eleventh Circuit rendered its decision. It
affirmed the district court's ruling on the APA claim, holding inva-
lid the INS's new detention policy. The Eleventh Circuit found
that the government had discriminated against the Haitians.5 ' The
appellate court held the district court's factual findings on the dis-
crimination issue were "clearly erroneous." 52 The court concluded
that the HRC's right of access under the first amendment was vio-
lated. The HRC attorneys were entitled to inform the detained
Haitians about their legal rights. The court of appeals remanded
the case to the district court with directions to provide specific re-
lief, including: (1) an injunction against the discriminatory enforce-
ment of a valid policy; (2) continued parole of class members; (3)
record-keeping that will ensure nondiscriminatory application of
immigration policies; (4) relief necessary to resolve the political
asylum and access issues; and (5) "whatever further relief is neces-
47. Id. at 1004.
48. 544 F. Supp. at 1005 n.2.
49. Jean v. Nelson, 683 F.2d 1311, 1312 (11th Cir. 1982).
50. The district court dismissed the Haitians' claims of a right to (1) counsel during
INS interviews; (2) notice of the nature of exclusion hearings; (3) access to counsel, friends,
and relatives; (4) notice of the existence of a right to apply for political asylum; and (5)
individual rather than mass exclusion hearings.
The court dismissed the first four claims on the ground that the violations alleged in
INS practices and procedures were reviewable on appeal to the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals and in a habeas proceeding, see supra note 26. The district court determined that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear these procedural claims. The fifth claim was dis-
missed as moot because the INS agreed to halt the mass exclusion hearings. Louis v. Meiss-
ner, 532 F. Supp. at 888-89.
51. Slip op. at 2823-25.
52. Id. at 2833.
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sary to ensure that all aliens, regardless of their nationality or ori-
gin, are accorded equal treatment.""3
III. THE AUTHORITY OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
The Eleventh Circuit incorrectly stated that "Congress and
the Executive branch share the immigration power."5 The legisla-
tive branch of the federal government has plenary power over im-
migration.5  Congress delegates to the executive branch limited au-
thority to administer immigration matters.56 Constitutionally, the
executive branch can exercise power over immigration in one of
two ways: either through the President's power over foreign af-
fairs5 7 or through a statutory delegation from Congress.
When the President acts in the immigration context, a distinc-
tion must be drawn between whether he is administering immigra-
tion matters or exercising his foreign affairs powers. The United
States Supreme Court has long recognized the distinction and has
carefully delineated the powers of the President in the immigra-
tion context.5 8 In Jean v. Nelson, however, the Eleventh Circuit
failed to distinguish between the two sources of presidential power.
The appellate court's commingling of presidential powers may
have invited the government's petition for a rehearing en banc.
The government contended in its petition for rehearing that the
Eleventh Circuit's decision in Jean v. Nelson encroaches on presi-
dential authority in immigration matters. 59 The portion of the
opinion that deals with delegation doctrine indicates that the
three-judge panel concluded that the President's authority over
our national borders also gives him authority to act in immigration
matters. 0
The Eleventh Circuit's opinion reveals an improper reading of
the Supreme Court's decision in Ekiu v. United States," the semi-
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2782.
55. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8; Lloyed Sabando Societa v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329, 334 (1932);
Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 336 (1908).
56. "[Tlhe Executive's authority is limited by the statutory grant of Congress," Slip op.
at 2781.
57. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
58. Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 652 (1891); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaugh-
nessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1949).
59. Appellants'/Cross-Appellees' Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing
En Banc, Jean v. Nelson, No. 82-5772 (11th Cir. Apr. 12, 1983).
60. Slip op. at 2782.
61. 142 U.S. 652 (1891).
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nal case on the issue of the constitutional allocation of immigration
power. Ekiu states that the power to admit or exclude aliens "may
be exercised either through treaties made by the President and the
Senate, or through statutes enacted by Congress. '6 2 The Presi-
dent's authority to affect immigration through treaties is inherent
in his power over international relations; 3 the Constitution confers
the immigration power on Congress."
The court of appeals similarly misapplied United States ex
rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy," an immigration case that arose dur-
ing World War II, in which the Supreme Court stated:
Normally Congress supplies the conditions of the privilege
of entry into the United States. But because the power of exclu-
sion of aliens is also inherent in the executive department of the
sovereign, Congress may in broad terms authorize the executive
to exercise the power, e.g., as was done here, for the best inter-
ests of the country during a time of national emergency."'
Both cases on which the Eleventh Circuit relied held that because
the President has inherent power ov'er foreign affairs, broad dele-
gations of power over immigration to the executive branch are per-
missible. "ITihat the formulation of these policies is entrusted ex-
clusively to Congress has become about as firmly embedded in the
legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of
our government. '67
Because Haitian immigration was a problem of national rather
than international concern, the President constitutionally could
not have exercised his power over foreign affairs to alter immigra-
tion policies.6 Accordingly, the President could only act pursuant
to his delegated powers. The Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) delegates to the President the power to suspend the entry of
aliens if he finds that their entry would be detrimental to the in-
terests of the United States. 9 The exercise of executive power
under the INA requires a presidential proclamation.70 President
62. Id. at 659.
63. Id.
64. Id. The Supreme Court in Ekiu upheld the constitutionality of a statute delegating
immigration power to the executive branch; the executive's inherent power was not an issue.
65. 338 U.S. 537 (1949).
66. Id. at 543.
67. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954).
68. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (broad military
powers of the Commander in Chief do not permit the President to halt a national strike).
69. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (1976).
70. Id.
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Reagan never issued a proclamation to suspend the entry of Hai-
tians, although he did issue a proclamation to interdict the sailing
vessels of all undocumented aliens on the high seas.71 A presiden-
tial proclamation is the prerequisite to the exercise of the powers
delegated to the executive under the INA. Failure to issue such a
proclamation negates any claim that the President was exercising
the power Congress delegated to him.
The INA confers additional authority over immigration mat-
ters to the executive branch. Under the INA, the Attorney General
may "in his discretion parole into the United States temporarily
under such conditions as he may prescribe. . . any alien applying
for admission to the United States ....",' Congress's delegation of
power to the Attorney General to parole does not encompass an
affirmative grant of power to detain, although a decision "not to
parole" effectively subjects an alien to detention. The Supreme
Court generally construes delegated powers narrowly to prevent
the exercise of unbridled discretion" and to avoid conflicts be-
tween the branches of government.74
For example, the Court held in Kent v. Dulles"1 that the Sec-
retary of State, who had broad discretion in passport matters, did
not have authority, absent a specific Congressional grant, to deny
passports to American citizens whom the Secretary believed to be
Communists. The case arose prior to the effective date of a law
that granted the Secretary power to deny passports to Commu-
nists. The Court refused to permit the Secretary to curtail the free
movement of citizens absent specific enabling legislation.76 The Su-
preme Court reasoned that Congress did not intend by its previous
silence to grant such pervasive power to the Secretary of State.
Similarly, in Jean v. Nelson, the Attorney General did not
have the specific authority to detain Haitians under the INA.
Three months after the detention of the Haitians began, the Rea-
gan administration proposed immigration legislation. 7 In his letter
71. Proclamation No. 4865, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,107 (1981).
72. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (Supp. V 1981).
73. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 128 (1958).
74. National Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340-41 (1974).
75. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
76. Although the case dealt with the exit rights of citizens rather than the entry rights
of aliens, the Court indicated that extreme conditions involving danger to public safety are a
prerequisite to permitting the legislative and executive branches to take coordinated actions
when the constitutional power belongs to Congress. Id. at 127, 130.
77. The Reagan administration's bill, the Omnibus Immigration Control Act, was intro-
duced on October 22, 1981. S. 1765, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. S11,992 (daily ed.
Oct. 22, 1981).
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transmitting the Omnibus Immigration Control Act, the Attorney
General recognized that existing legislation's "probably would not
authorize such procedures as . . .the detention of aliens pending
deportation proceedings .... "9 Congress still has not passed the
Omnibus Immigration Control Act, which would empower the
President to declare an immigration emergency.80 Under the ad-
ministration's proposed bill the President would be able to expe-
dite exclusion and asylum claims and to detain aliens pending de-
portation proceedings;" he does not have this power now.
Congress's failure to legislate on the controversial subject of
immigration"2 does not empower the executive branch to imple-
ment its own immigration policies. The President did not use his
delegated power, which would have required a proclamation, to ex-
clude the Haitians. The Attorney General did not have the author-
ity to detain Haitians. The executive branch clearly usurped the
power of Congress. There was considerable public sentiment in
favor of the government's policy of detaining Haitians, but popular
appeal does not justify disregard for the law.8" The Constitution
confers on Congress the power to formulate immigration policy.
IV. VIOLATION OF APA RULEMAKING PROCEDURES
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that
the implementation of the new detention policy without compli-
ance with APA procedures" rendered the policy invalid. The gov-.
78. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (Supp.
V 1981).
79. Letter from Attorney General William French Smith to the Vice President of the
United States, reprinted in 127 CONG. REc. S12,084-85 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1981).
80. Omnibus Immigration Control Act, S1765, tit. VII, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG.
REc. S11,999-12,001 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1981).
81. Id. at § 240B., 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S11,999-12,000 (daily ed. Oct.
22, 1981).
82. The House Judiciary Committee noted the President's ongoing review of immigra-
tion policy and expected that the administration would submit legislation "in the near fu-
ture." H.R. Rep. No. 264, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2577, 2579. Because of the overall consideration that the administration was giving to
immigration policy, the House Judiciary Committee restricted the scope of the amendments
to the Immigration and Nationality Act to reforms that the committee considered urgent
and noncontroversial. Id.
83. The Eleventh Circuit noted that the district court's opinion stressed one principle:
the government must "act within the letter of the law." Slip op. at 2778.
84. The APA's notice and comment provision provides:
§ 553. Rule making
(a) This section applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the
extent that there is involved-
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ernment had failed to promulgate the policy in accordance with
the APA's "notice and comment" requirements.5 The government
initially argued that it had not engaged in rulemaking because
statutes both mandated detention and left parole in the discretion
of the Attorney General.86 Thus, no rule8 7 was necessary to imple-
(1) a military or foreign affairs function of the United States; or
(2) a matter relating to agency management or personnel or to
public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts.
(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal
Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served
or otherwise have actual notice thereof in accordance with law. The notice shall
include-
(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule
making proceedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is pro-
posed; and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a
description of the subjects and issues involved.
Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection does not
apply-
(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules
of agency organization, procedure, or practice; or
(B) when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the
finding and a brief statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued)
that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unneces-
sary, or contrary to the public interest.
(c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested
persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of
written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presenta-
tion. After consideration of the relevrant matter presented, the agency shall in-
corporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and
purpose. When rules are required by statute to be made on the record after op-
portunity for an agency hearing, sections 556 and 557 of this title apply instead
of this subsection.
(d) The required publication or service of a substantive rule shall be made
not less than 30 days before its effective date, except-
(1) a substantive rule which grants or recognizes an exemption
or relieves a restriction;
(2) interpretative rules and statements of policy; or
(3) as otherwise provided by the agency for good cause found
and published with the rule.
(e) Each agency shall give an interested person the right to petition for the
issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.
5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
85. Id. § 553(b).
86. Slip op. at 2794 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (detention) & § 1182(d)(5)(A) (parole)).
87. The APA defines the word "rule" as follows:
[T]he whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicabil-
ity and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy
or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency
and includes the approval or prescription for the future of rates, wages, corpo-
rate or financial structures or reorganizations thereof, prices, facilities, appli-
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ment the policy.18 The circuit court held that the admnistration's
announcement of the detention policy amounted to a new rule of
"general applicability."" e Accordingly, the INS should have fol-
lowed APA rulemaking procedures. The court stated that a far-
reaching general policy that explicitly reverses a longstanding pol-
icy is a rule.90 The government argued alternatively that, even if
announcement of the new policy established a rule, surrounding
circumstances brought the detention policy within the ambit of
three specific exceptions to the notice and comment
requirements. 1
First, the government asserted an exemption because the pol-
icy dealt with a "foreign affairs function of the United States."' 2
The Eleventh Circuit indicated Congress's intent that the excep-
tion be narrowly construed, 3 and added that nothing in the record
supported a finding that notice and comment rulemaking would
have resulted in "undesirable international consequences."94 Sec-
ond, the court found that the government's action could not come
within the "interpretative rule" exception. 5 The new policy did
not merely clarify or explain existing policy; it was actually "a sub-
stantive modification [of existing regulations] or adoption of new
regulations."' 6 Third, the government claimed that its action was a
"general statement of policy.' 7 The circuit court affirmed the dis-
ances, services or allowances therefor or of valuations, costs, or accounting, or
practices bearing on any of the foregoing ....
5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1976) (emphasis supplied).
88. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
89. See the APA's definition of "rule" supra note 87.
90. Slip op. at 2794 (quoting American Trucking Ass'n v. United States, 688 F.2d 1337
(11th Cir. 1982)).
91. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976), supra note 84.
92. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (1976).
93. Slip op. at 2795 (quoting S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1945)).
94. Slip op. at 2796. The court factually distinguished the government's cases as involv-
ing graver international consequences: Nademi v. INS, 679 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1982) (visa
regulation for Iranian nationals during hostage crisis upheld); Malek-Marzbar v. INS, 653
F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 161 (1982) (departure regulations for Ira-
nian nationals in response to hostage crisis upheld); Yassini v. Crosland, 618 F.2d 1356 (9th
Cir. 1980) (INS directive rescinding deferred departures for Iranian students held to be
within foreign affairs exception due to the President's response to the takeover of the
United States Embassy in Teheran).
95. See 5 US.C. § 553(b)(A) supra note 84. The exception under this subsection covers
both "interpretative rules" and "general statements of policy." The circuit court noted that
the government neither distinguished the two nor offered any legal argument for the asser-
tion that the policy change was merely an interpretative rule. Slip op. at 2796-97.
96. Slip op. at 2797 (quoting Brown Express, Inc. v. United States, 607 F.2d 695, 700
(5th Cir. 1979)).
97. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) supra note 84.
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trict court's conclusion that this exception was inappropriate, but
determined that the lower court had applied an incorrect test.98
The Eleventh Circuit held that the general statement of policy
exception does not apply to a rule that establishes a "binding
norm," e a rule whereby those implementing the policy have no
discretion in its application. In developing the binding norm
test,100 the court briefly analyzed the function served by notice and
comment rulemaking. Citing the District of Columbia Circuit's
opinion in Guardian Federal Savings and Loan Association v.
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corp.,'01 the court empha-
sized that rulemaking procedures increase "the likelihood of ad-
ministrative responsiveness to the needs and concerns of those af-
fected." 02 The opportunity for objection to a new policy through
notice and comment rulemaking would be paramount where the
policy does not allow discretionary application, effectively preclud-
ing the public's ability to challenge the policy's application to
unique circumstances at some time in the future. The exceptions
to notice and comment procedures "accommodate situations where
the policies promoted by public participation in rulemaking are
outweighed by the countervailing considerations of effectiveness,
efficiency, expedition, and reduction in expense."' 03 The proper
balance between the interests of the government and the public
depends upon the degree to which the rule establishes a "binding
norm."
The peculiar facts of this case prompted the court to conclude
that the new policy had the effect of a binding norm.104 In the ab-
98. See Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. at 996-97. The district court found the "general
statement of policy" exception did not apply for two reasons. First, the policy did not set a
goal for the future, but rather reflected a procedure in immediate effect. Second, the lower
court found the policy had a "substantial impact" on the incarcerated Haitians. Id. at 1000.
Neither of these findings, according to the circuit court, were sufficient as a basis for con-
cluding that the new rule could not be deemed a general statement of policy.
99. The term "binding norm," in this context, apparently originated in Parker, The
Administrative Procedure Act: A Study in Overestimation, 60 YALE L.J. 581 (1958). See
also Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(cited in Guardian Fed. Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Federal Savings and Loan Ins. Corp., 589
F.2d 658, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
100. The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged Guardian Fed. Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Fed-
eral Savings and Loan Ins. Corp., 589 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1978), as the source of the test it
adopted while attempting to further develop the underlying rationale. Slip op. at 2800 n.21.
101. 589 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
102. Slip op. at 2800 (citing 589 F.2d at 662).
103. Slip op. at 2800 (quoting Guardian Federal, 589 F.2d at 662).
104. Slip op. at 2801-02 n.24. The Eleventh Circuit's application of the binding norm
rule is problematical because the court retrospectively viewed the rule's effect to determine
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sence of specific guidelines, "the immigration inspectors enforced
the detention policy as if it was intended to apply solely, and uni-
formly, to Haitians. ' 10 5 Ranking government officials testified that
the rigid, nondiscretionary policy of detention implemented by
their subordinates was not the policy they had intended.106 Never-
theless, the policy as implemented established a binding norm and
should have been subjected to notice and comment rulemaking107
One may misapprehend the significance of the APA issue as
being merely of a technical nature: the INS failed to follow APA
procedures as the courts said they must. The opinion limits federal
agencies' future use of delegated authority to implement policy.
Congress created the "general statement of policy" exception to es-
tablished rulemaking procedures: the Eleventh Circuit gave mean-
ing to the phrase.108 In adopting the "binding norm" test, the Elev-
enth Circuit joined the growing number of circuits that have
recently expressed concern over defining the limits of power dele-
gated to executive agencies.
Because "the vast majority of challenges to administrative
agency action are brought to the Court of Appeals for the District
whether the rule created a binding norm. A prospective judicial approach is incompatible
with an agency's obligation to make prospective determination of whether to engage in no-
tice and comment rule making.
105. Slip op. at 2801.
106. Discerning precisely the intended effect of the new policy presented a problem to
both the district court and the Eleventh Circuit. The testimony of former INS Commis-
sioner Doris Meissner, Associate Attorney General Rudolph Giuliani, and INS Commis-
sioner Nelson actually conflicted as to the meaning and details of the policy. For examples
of the conflicts in testimony, see slip op. at 2788-89 n.9. "The officials contradicted one
another several times, and did not agree on the substance of the policy. This evidence, and
lack thereof, indicates the disarray with which the Administration pursued its new policy."
Slip op. at 2788.
107. Pursuant to an order rendered by the district court, Louis v. Nelson, No. 81-1260-
CIV-EPS (S.D. Fla. July 2, 1982) (30-day stay of injunction against enforcement of the de-
tention policy with respect to future illegal entrants), the INS published an interim rule in
the Federal Register regarding detention and parole of aliens. 47 Fed. Reg. 30,044 (1982) (to
be codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 212, 235). Although the publication solicited comments during a
30-day period commencing July 9, 1982, it involved the APA exception to the usually re-
quired 30-day period preceding the effective date. See supra note 84, APA § 553(d)(3). The
INS cited as the requisite "good cause" for the APA exception that "the delays involved in
customary publication would seriously impair the Service's ability to protect the country's
borders and would be detrimental to the public interest." 47 Fed. Reg. at 30,044.
108. The court's treatment of the "foreign affairs" and "interpretative rules" exceptions
suggests their application to these facts was not difficult to dismiss. See slip op. at 2795-97.
The court dedicated considerably more attention to the "general statement of policy" excep-
tion than to the other two exceptions combined. "[A]nalyzing a rule within the general
statement of policy exception is akin to wandering lost in the Serbonian Bog." Slip op. at
2799.
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of Columbia Circuit,"109 that court has played a major role in in-
terpreting the APA. In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Federal Power
Commission,'" the District of Columbia Circuit distinguished a
bona fide general statement of policy from a substantive rule by
noting that the former
. . does not establish a "binding norm." It is not finally deter-
minative of the issues or rights to which it is addressed. The
agency cannot apply or rely upon a general statement of policy
as law because a general statement of policy only announces
what the agency seeks to establish as policy. A policy statement
announces the agency's tentative intentions for the future.'
Four years later in Guardian Federal, the District of Columbia
Circuit Court devised an additional standard for assessing whether
a rule was "finally determinative of the issues or rights to which it
is addressed,"' 12 and therefore a binding norm rather than a gen-
eral statement of policy. Guardian Federal focused on the rule's
effect on discretionary application: "If it appears that a so-called
[statement of general policy] is in purpose or likely effect one that
narrowly limits administrative discretion, it will be taken for what
it is-a binding rule of substantive law."" 3
The District of Columbia Circuit Court in American Bus As-
sociation v. United States" 4 restated the alternative criteria for a
binding norm. A purported statement of general policy is subject
to rulemaking requirements if that policy (1) has an effect that is
not exclusively prospective or (2) prevents or impedes the freedom
of the agency and its decisionmakers to exercise discretion. 115 At
least five circuits have employed these criteria." 6
In Jean v. Nelson, the district court relied on the first crite-
rion of American Bus and concluded that the detention policy's
109. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 535 n.4 (1978).
110. 506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
111. Id. at 38 (emphasis supplied).
112. 589 F.2d at 666 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (quoting Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. FPC, 506
F.2d 33, 38 (1974)).
113. Id. at 666. The Eleventh Circuit quoted this language in its opinion. Slip op. at
2800-01 n.21.
114. 627 F.2d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
115. Id. at 529.
116. See American Mining Congress v. Marshall, 671 F.2d 1251 (10th Cir. 1982); Cleve-
land Cliffs Iron Co. v. I.C.C., 664 F.2d 568 (6th Cir. 1981); American Trucking Ass'n v.
I.C.C., 659 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1981); Iowa Power & Light Co. v. Burlington Northern, Inc.,
647 F.2d 796 (8th Cir. 1981); American Bus Ass'n v. United States, 627 F.2d 525 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
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failure to apply only prospectively was indicative of its binding na-
ture." The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the district court even
though other circuits have generally accepted the first criterion.'18
The Eleventh Circuit remarked that "[nlothing in the statutory
phrase 'general statement of policy' requires or even suggests that
to fall within the exception the policy must take effect in the
future." 19
The court's desire to emphasize the second standard-the pol-
icy's effect on the exercise of discretion-caused it to focus its at-
tention on whether "the agency, or its implementing official, [was]
free to exercise discretion to follow,, or not to follow, the general
policy in an individual case."1 0 The court did not, however, fully
acknowledge the extent to which discretion was abridged in this
case. The new policy also eliminated the discretion that INS offi-
cials had exercised under the old policy of general parole.' 2 ' Before
the announcement of the new policy, INS officials exercised their
discretion in paroling aliens.'22 Under the new policy as imple-
mented, mandatory detention superseded the preexisting discre-
tion of parole. Without a written policy to scrutinize, the Eleventh
Circuit had to examine the way immigration officials actually im-
plemented the policy. The court found that the policy's vagueness
resulted in "[a] broad rule of detention with undefined excep-
tions-susceptible to rigid enforcement with no opportunity to
avoid the rule's harsh results."'12 INS employees at the operational
level understood that all Haitians were to be detained on a nondis-
cretionary basis. While the feared result of an absence of guide-
lines is the exercise of unbridled discretion, the lack of standards
in this case, ironically, caused a totally nondiscretionary policy of
detention.
The Eleventh Circuit made clear that parties affected by
agency policy changes must have the opportunity to challenge
117. The district court had stated that
[t]he new detention policy is not a general statement of policy that INS hopes to
implement in the future. It is being implemented right now! Nor does it set a
goal that future proceedings may achieve, for the change has been presented as a
fait accompli .... Thus, the new criteria for release is not exempt from APA
requirements as a "general statement of policy."
Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. at 973, 996-97.
118. See cases supra note 116.
119. Slip op. at 2798.
120. Slip op. at 2800.
121. See slip op. at 2785-86.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 5-9.
123. Slip op. at 2802.
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those policies, either by notice and comment rulemaking or on a
case-by-case basis at the level of implementation. These safeguards
ensure clear guidelines. Whether the failure to provide guidelines
resulted from administrative oversight or a calculated attempt to
avoid public scrutiny of a controversial policy remains a subject for
speculation. In either case, the court sent a message to policymak-
ers: the public must be able to challenge new agency policies that
affect substantial rights.
V. A STARK PATTERN OF DISCRIMINATION
The Haitians did not challenge the government's sovereign
power to detain aliens.1 2' Rather, they asserted that the INS dis-
criminated on the basis of race or national origin, in the exercise of
its parole power.1 25 Accordingly, the Haitians claimed a violation of
their fifth amendment right to equal protection of the laws.2 The
district court found that the INS's new policy had a greater impact
on the Haitians than on other nationalities, but concluded that the
Haitians had not proven that the INS discriminatorily applied its
parole policy.127 The Eleventh Circuit held this conclusion to be
124. "Every alien ... who may not appear to the examining immigration officer at the
port of arrival to be clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to land shall be detained for fur-
ther inquiry." 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (1976) (emphasis supplied). The Haitians could not chal-
lenge the statute as violative of their constitutional rights because Congress has plenary
authority over immigration matters. See supra note 55.
125. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (Supp. V 1981), which authorizes the attorney general to
parole excludable aliens. The plaintiffs are excludable aliens. 544 F. Supp. at 998.
126. The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that the Haitians had a fifth amendment right
to equal protection of laws. Although the fifth amendment does not contain an equal protec-
tion clause, it does protect all "persons" from invidious discrimination by the federal gov-
ernment. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976). It is the discrimination that violates the
due process requirement of the fifth amendment. Weisenberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636,
638 n.2 (1975). Under the fifth amendment, analysis of discrimination is treated the same as
equal protection analysis under the fourteenth amendment. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 93. Aliens
seeking initial admission are "persons" guaranteed due process of law by the fifth and four-
teenth amendments. Plyler v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 2391 (1982). Accordingly, although Con-
gress has delegated to the executive branch the power to parole aliens, see 8 U.S.C. §
1182(d) (Supp. V 1981), the fifth amendment prohibits the executive from exercising power
in an invidiously discriminatory manner, such as on the basis of race or national origin.
The government did not appeal the issue of whether the Haitians had a fifth amend-
ment right to equal protection. Nevertheless, the circuit court affirmed the district court's
determination that they did. Slip op. at 2803 n.28.
In addition to the fifth amendment violation, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the Hai-
tians had an alternative challenge to the INS's actions. The court determined that Congress
intended that the INS apply the parole statutes in a nondiscriminatory fashion. Slip op. at
2804-05. Thus, the Haitians could have challenged the INS on statutory grounds.
127. 544 F. Supp. at 1001.
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"clearly erroneous '  and declared that the evidence disclosed "a
stark pattern of discrimination.' ' 12 9
The court of appeals carefully examined whether the Haitians
had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the govern-
ment's actions reflected, in part, discriminatory intent. 30 The
court concluded that the Haitians had produced sufficient evidence
to support a prima facie' claim and that the government had not
rebutted successfully the Haitians' showing. 32
The Haitians presented statistical evidence to establish dis-
criminatory intent. "' An expert, after analyzing data supplied by
the INS,'" testified that the difference between the number of
Haitians who should have been released according to the statistics
and the actual number released was a "'statistical joke.' "15 If
Haitians and non-Haitians were detained or paroled for the same
reasons, there should have been no significant statistical difference
128. Slip op. at 2815.
129. Id. at 2807.
130. Under the rule enunciated in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), a party challenging an action as discriminatory must estab-
lish that the challenged action was motivated at least in part by a discriminatory purpose.
The impact of a practice may provide circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent. Id.
at 265-66.
131. A prima facie case would be established solely on the basis of the evidence
presented by the plaintiff if the plaintiff could survive a motion to dismiss at the close of its
case. Slip op. at 2807.
132. The Eleventh Circuit noted that the district court blended its analysis of the pre-
liminary and ultimate factual issues. Id. The court postulated that had the district court
analyzed the sub-issues separately, it too would have concluded that the Haitians' statistical
evidence established a stark pattern of discrimination. Id.
133. The court stated that the statistical evidence alone estabished "a prima facie
showing of discriminatory intent" under the standard of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 252
(1977). Slip op. at 2810.
134. The data were "uniquely in the government's possession" and made available to
the Haitians only after numerous discovery requests and motions. Slip op. at 2820 n.46. This
data came from three separate sources: (1) secondary inspection logs prepared at Miami
International Airport between August 1981 and April 1982, (2) INS District VI (the South
Florida region) records for August 1 through November 1, 1982, and (3) Krome Avenue
detention facility computer records for January through April, 1982.
The first set of data reflected the results of secondary inspection of immigrants, which
occurred when the initial immigration officer doubted an individual's right to enter. Individ-
uals who underwent secondary inspections were either paroled, paroled for exclusionary
hearing, detained, or inspection was deferred. Id. at 2808-09. The second set of data covered
persons placed in exclusion proceedings or in an exclusion category, and included, inter alia,
nationality, length of detention, and date of parole. Id. at 2809. The final set of data con-
tained detention and parole information from the Krome Avenue detention facility. Id. at
2810.
135. Id. at 2809. The government challenged the expert's statistical methodology. See
infra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
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between the two populations. In the expert's opinion, the
probability that the statistical differences resulted from chance
was "'on the order of less than two in ten billion' "36 and in some
cases "'far less than one in ten billion.' ",l13 From this severely dis-
proportionate impact on Haitians, the appellate court inferred a
discriminatory governmental intent.
The Haitians introduced nonstatistical evidence also.13 8 Both
government and nongovernment witnesses testified that Haitians
as a group were consistently singled out for mistreatment; this es-
tablished a history of discrimination.13 9 Certain departures from
normal exclusion adjudication procedures, such as mass hearings
behind closed doors with inadequate translators, further indicated
discriminatory intent. 40 Finally, an examination of INS papers re-
vealed a special "Haitian Program."1'  Unlike documents pertain-
ing to other aliens, the INS coded by name or by number docu-
ments referring to Haitian immigrants. 4" This nonstatistical
evidence,143 together with the Haitians' statistical evidence, con-
vinced the Eleventh Circuit that the Haitians had established a
prima facie case of intentional governmental discrimination.
Next, the court examined the government's rebuttal.' The
government challenged the Haitians' statistical evidence, claiming
that the statistical method used by their expert witness was not
136. Slip op. at 2809.
137. Id.
138. When impact alone is insufficient to prove discriminatory intent because the im-
pact does not establish a stark pattern of discrimination, courts should consider the follow-
ing circumstancial evidence: (1) historical background, (2) the sequence of events leading up
to the challenged action, (3) departures from normal procedures as well as substantive de-
partures, and (4) legislative or administrative history. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-68.
139. Slip op. at 2811. Additionally, the court accepted evidence of "numerous lawsuits
initiated in the past to challenge disparate treatment of Haitian immigrants" as proof that
satisfied the historical background requirement of Arlington Heights. Id.
140. Id. at 2813.
141. Id. at 2814.
142. Id. One telex communication from an INS Regional Commissioner to subordinates
indicated that some administration officials understood that the new policy was not to be
applied universally. The telex, dated September 2, 1981, provided in full:
PRIORITY
BE ADVISED CURRENT SERVICE POLICY AND SOUTHERN REGION
POLICY RE (HAITIANS) APPLICANTS FOR ADMISSION/ASYLUM RE-
QUIRE THEY BE DETAINED PER I&NA 235(B) AND 8 CFR 235.3(B).
Id. at 2815 (parenthetical in original).
143. The court held that the district court erroneously disregarded evidence of the Ar-
lington Heights factors, which showed an "ongoing pattern of discrimination." Id. at 2811
(emphasis in original); see also supra note 138.
144. Slip op. at 2815-23.
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valid to prove discriminatory impact. The expert had performed a
binomial analysis on the data.14 5 This statistical method predicts
the existence of a non-random factor as the explanation for varia-
tions between populations. The plaintiffs contended that discrimi-
nation was the non-random factor that produced a lower parole
rate for Haitians than for non-Haitians. The government argued
that binomial analysis was not valid to prove impact because pa-
role is not a random process. The government asserted also that a
number of nondiscriminatory factors used by INS officers in their
parole decisions accounted for the treatment of Haitians.
The Eleventh Circuit discounted the government's argument
for several reasons. The United States Supreme Court has allowed
binomial analysis in discrimination cases even though more than
one non-random factor might account for the statistical dispari-
ties.146 The Court has stated also that "fine tuning" of statistics is
not necessary when there is a glaring discrepancy. 147 The Eleventh
Circuit, unlike the district court, was not troubled by the expert's
failure to account for potentially significant nondiscriminatory fac-
tors that might enter into parole decisions.14 8 Because the INS had
no published parole policy, the Eleventh Circuit viewed as nonsen-
sical any requirement that the plaintiffs' statistics account for
vague, uncertain, or unknown factors.149 The court was particularly
disturbed that the government failed to offer its own statistical ev-
idence in rebuttal.15 0
145. Binomial analysis compares the incidence of an event in a specific population (e.g.,
the parole rate for Haitians) with the incidence of an event in a base population (e.g., the
parole rate of non-Haitians). The extent to which the specific population's rate varies from
the base population's rate is ultimately expressed in terms of standard deviations. The
United States Supreme Court has stated that "[als a general rule . . .if the difference be-
tween the [two rates] is greater than two or three standard deviations," then a non-random
factor, such as discrimination, is responsible for the difference. Castanada v. Partida, 430
U.S. 482, 497 n.17 (1977).
146. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (employ-
ment discrimination); Castanada v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (jury selection).
147. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 342 n.23 (1977).
The Supreme Court has warned also that "[w]hen special qualifications are required ... ,
comparisons to the general population . . . may have little probative value." Hazelwood
School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, .308 n.13 (1977) (employment discrimination).
148. The expert did attempt to account for one potential nondiscriminatory fac-
tor-documentation status. Adjusting the District VI data, see supra note 134, to reflect
documentation status, the expert found that only one out of more than 20 tests yielded
results showing a nondiscriminatory impact. Slip op. at 2809. The expert did not analyze
other potentially significant factors, such as age, reason for entry, or health status. Louis v.
Nelson, 544 F. Supp. at 982.
149. Slip op. at 2817.
150. In all, the court gave seven reasons why the government's rebuttal of the plaintiffs'
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As the second prong of its rebuttal, the government offered
three explanations for the disparate treatment of the Haitians.15 1
First, the government argued that the district court's injunction
prohibiting exclusion hearings for unrepresented class members
was responsible for the prolonged detention of the Haitians. Dis-
agreeing, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the government's
new immigration policy, and not the injunction, precluded parole.
Additionally, the court hesitated to allow the government to profit
from its own wrongdoing.
Second, the government argued that the INS, which had
adopted special procedures to ensure that Haitians were not co-
erced into voluntarily withdrawing from our borders, prolonged the
detention. In response to HRC challenges of coercion and misrep-
resentation by INS officials, the INS changed procedures and re-
quired an immigration judge to preside at voluntary withdrawal
proceedings. This slowed the processing of Haitians. The court did
not, however, agree that this special INS procedure prevented the
paroling of Haitians.
In addition to blaming the district court and the INS, the gov-
ernment accused the State Department of requiring Haitians to
present more evidence than non-Haitians were required to present
to establish a claim for asylum. This greater burden of proof for
political asylum further delayed parole, according to the govern-
ment. The court concluded that the INS, regardless of State De-
partment policy, had an obligation to expedite asylum procedures.
Overall, the Eleventh Circuit found "a strong case of discrimi-
nation," rebutted only by "self-serving" testimony, "mere
protestations," and "arguments of counsel."' 15 The court found
that the INS had indeed violated the Haitians' fifth amendment
equal protection rights.
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF EXCLUDABLE ALIENS
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Jean v. Nelson is signifi-
statistical evidence failed. See slip op. at 2816-21.
151. The district court found merit in these contentions, stating that the disparate im-
pact could be explained "on grounds other than race and/or national origin." 544 F. Supp.
at 1000. The Eleventh Circuit, on the other hand, characterized the explanations as "cul-
prits" that the government used to exonerate itself from responsibility for the disparate
impact of its new immigration policy upon the Haitians. Slip op. at 2821-23. The circuit
court rejected the explanations as "largely irrelevant." Id. at 2821.
152. Id. at 2823.
153. Id. at 2824.
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cant in its finding of large-scale discrimination by the federal gov-
ernment on the basis of race or national origin. While cases involv-
ing discrimination by state governments are legion,"" the federal
government has rarely been found liable for similar constitutional
violations.' The opinion is most noteworthy, however, because it
concluded that excludable aliens"" have fifth amendment rights.15 7
There is a paucity of precedent for this conclusion.
The Supreme Court of the United States has said repeatedly
that the Constitution gives Congress plenary authority over immi-
gration matters.1" Accordingly, the Court has held that Congress
may exclude aliens for any reason, including race or national ori-
gin.15 Not all aliens have the same constitutional rights. An alien
who has entered the country, even illegally, has constitutional
rights that substantially limit the powers of both state and na-
tional governments.'"0 Conversely, an alien who is stopped at the
border prior to entry is excludable and has few constitutional
rights."' His status as an excludable alien does not change when
he is taken to a detention facility physically within the country or
when he is paroled into the country pending an exclusion hear-
ing.' The Supreme Court has created a legal fiction that the alien
is standing at the border and has never "entered" the country. "'
The Court has not accorded excludable aliens the fifth amend-
ment right to due process in immigration matters, as Shaughnessy
154. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977) (denial of zoning request violated equal protection clause); Graham v. Richard-
son, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (discrimination against aliens in awarding state welfare benefits
violated equal protection clause); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (state antimiscegena-
tion statute violated equal protection clause); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966) (poll tax violated equal protection clause).
155. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hibayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1942). But see Hill v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976) (Department of
Housing and Urban Development violated fifth amendment and Civil Rights Act of 1964).
156. The Haitians were considered excludable aliens as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)
(West 1970 & Supp. 1983).
157. Slip op. at 2803.
158. See supra note 55.
159. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
160. See Plyler v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 2391 (1982).
161. See Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. 321, 329 (1982) ("alien seeking initial admis-
sion to the United States requests a privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his
application"). See generally Note, The Constitutional Rights of Excluded Aliens: Proposed
Limitations on the Indefinite Detention of the Cuban Refugees, 70 GEo. L.J. 1303, 1306-09
(1982).
162. See Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)
(West Supp. 1983) (parole of excludable aliens is not regarded as admission).
163. See Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958).
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v. United States ex rel. Mezei'"I acutely illustrates. For national
security reasons, the Attorney General excluded Mezei, an alien,
from the country. To avoid publicly disclosing the confidential in-
formation on which the exclusion decision was made, the Attorney
General denied Mezei a hearing. No other country would accept
him, and Mezei was detained at Ellis Island for twenty-one
months. The Supreme Court framed the issue as whether the At-
torney General's continued exclusion of Mezei without a hearing
was "an unlawful detention."' " The Court held that the denial of
a hearing did not violate due process. Rather, the Court said,
"Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due pro-
cess as far as the alien denied entry is concerned."' 6
The Eleventh Circuit confronts this doctrine in Jean v. Nel-
son. The Haitians are excludable aliens. The Krome Avenue deten-
tion facility is an Ellis Island. The legal problem parallels that of
Mezei-that is, whether the executive branch's prolonged deten-
tion of the Haitians was unlawful.
To circumvent Mezei, the Haitians argued, and the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed, that excludable aliens have a fifth amendment
right, narrowly confined, that protects them against invidious dis-
crimination in the enforcement of certain procedures attendant to
the alien-admissions process. The Haitians do not have a due pro-
cess right to the availability of parole, but they do have an equal
protection right to be treated in a nondiscriminatory manner in
whatever parole process has been provided.
Does this mean that Congress could have prohibited parole
solely for Haitians? Language in the opinion implies an affirmative
answer. In acknowledging that excludable aliens may not have full
equal protection rights, the court argued that because Congress en-
acted a neutral parole statute, the executive was obliged to enforce
it in a nondiscriminatory fashion.16 "This distinction, between leg-
islation and enforcement, is critical. Congress can legitimately
make distinctions among . . . aliens that would be unacceptable if
applied to citizens, . . . but '[i]n the enforcement of these policies,
the Executive Branch of the government must respect the proce-
dural safeguards of due process.' ,68
164. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
165. Id. at 207.
166. Id. at 212 (quoting United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaugnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544
(1950)).
167. Slip op. at 2804-05.
168. Id. at 2805 (quoting the district court's opinion, 544 F. Supp. at 998 (quoting Gal-
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To overcome the excludable alien fiction, the court boldly set
up its own paradigm. Excludable aliens have no fifth amendment
right of due process or equal protection in regard to immigration
legislation, but the fifth amendment protects Haitians from invidi-
ously discriminatory enforcement of the legislation. The opinion,
however, illustrates the problem of outdated case law. The court
apparently considered itself bound by the "entry fiction," which
poses a doctrinal barrier to constitutional rights of aliens. Unfortu-
nately, the court was forced to construct a contorted paradigm to
achieve a just result.
A better doctrinal approach would extend full constitutional
rights to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States. For almost one hundred years the United States Supreme
Court has recognized that any person within a state's jurisdiction,
including an illegal alien, enjoys at least some constitutional
rights."1 9 Today, the Court is moving towards an extension of equal
protection guarantees to all persons within the territory of the
United States.17 0 This approach reflects the understanding that the
Constitution governs all activity within the United States.
By clothing all persons with full constitutional rights at the
moment they become subject to this country's laws, we avoid the
inequities inherent in the current doctrinal formulation. Under
Knauff a person's constitutional rights are defined by reference to
the power granted to Congress. Under the profferred approach,
courts no longer would need to make difficult factual decisions as
to when constitutional rights attach.17 1 Instead, courts would de-
cide constitutional claims raised by illegal aliens-excludable or
deportable-no differently than similar claims raised by citizens. 17
Thus, an equal protection claim raised by any alien would be ana-
lyzed in three steps:
(1) Does the government activity discriminate in its treatment
of the alien?
(2) What level of scrutiny is appropriate in examining the va-
vin v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954)) (emphasis in district court opinion).
169. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (deportable alien entitled to four-
teenth amendment equal protection guarantees).
170. "Our cases applying the Equal Protection Clause reflect the same territorial theme
." Plyler v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. at 2392 (footnote omitted) (deportable illegal aliens). The
fifth and sixth amendments have long protected all persons within United States territorial
jurisdiction. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
171. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
172. For a similar approach to the issue of aliens' constitutional rights, see Note, supra
note 161.
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lidity of the governmental activity given the nature of the classifi-
cation or the right involved?
(3) Under that level of scrutiny, is the challenged governmen-
tal activity constitutional?
In Jean v. Nelson the above issues would have been resolved
as follows: First, the Haitians proved that the government discrim-
inated against them.'7 3 Second, the government's activity distin-
guished between persons on the basis of national origin, a suspect
classification, 74 which demands strict scrutiny. Third, the govern-
ment did not meet its burden of proving both that detention
served a compelling interest and that it was the least restrictive
means to that end.17
This analysis is not limited to the enforcement of immigration
laws by the executive branch; it also applies to Congress's exercise
of its power in formulating immigration laws. The Constitution
grants Congress plenary power to make these laws, '7  but when
Congress enacts a law repugnant to the Constitution, the courts
have a duty to declare that law void. 77
Granting constitutional rights to all persons within the territo-
rial jurisdiction of the United States would allow the courts to test
the constitutionality of immigration laws. In the equal protection
context, any challenge requiring greater judicial scrutiny than
"mere rationality" will force the government, at a minimum, to ar-
ticulate the interest being served by its course of action. Only when
competing interests are identified can courts fairly decide cases ac-
cording to constitutional mandates.
173. See supra notes 125-33 and accompanying text.
174. Oyama v. California, 322 U.S. 633, 646 (1948); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
175. The Eleventh Circuit's equal protection analysis was incomplete. By only perform-
ing the first step of the analysis, one could infer that the court considered discriminatory
classification to be unconstitutional per se. Perhaps the court implicitly applied strict scru-
tiny and held that the government failed to prove a compelling interest, given the court's
finding that the government's case consisted of "nothing but the 'mere protestations' and
'arguments of counsel." Slip op. at 2824.
176. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
177. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803). Congress's immigration
power is analagous to its commerce power under the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3. If one adopts the position. that Congress has plenary power over the content of immigra-
tion laws, then courts must defer to Congress under the political question doctrine on issues
concerning who may be admitted, or the criteria to be used for admissions decisions. Any
controversies beyond this limited scope would be justiciable. Thus all laws detailing admis-
sions procedures would be subject to judicial review.
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VII. FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF ACCESS
On August 10, 1981, Defendants conducted proceedings for
four or five Haitian aliens who had requested counsel without
advising counsel for HRC, Inc., of these hearings. As a result,
without representation, these aliens were issued final orders of
exclusion and deportation. Moreover, as without counsel, they
failed to understand their right to appeal, they failed to file the
requisite notice of appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals..
. . Their only possible recourse is the filing of a habeas corpus
petition to review the fairness of the procedures they were sub-
jected to. This conceivable remedy is available, of course, only if
these aliens may have access to counsel and counsel may have
access to aliens to explain the nature of this remedy. Yet, when
an HRC, Inc. attorney requested to meet with these refugees to
inform them of their right to file a habeas corpus petition to
challenge the legality of the exclusion procedures to which they
were subjected, and to offer to provide representation . . . de-
fendants denied counsel for HRC, Inc. access to these aliens....
The habeas remedy for these aliens is, of course, totally
meaningless. 178
The HRC assserted that the INS had violated its political and
associational rights to gather and disperse information under the
first amendment by severely restricting its access to the detained
Haitians. The Haitians alleged that the INS had also violated their
first amendment right to communicate with HRC attorneys and
employees, and with friends and relatives.17 9 Concluding that the
detention was unlawful under the APA, the district court held
these access claims were moot.180 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed.
Because the INS could revoke the parole of class members under
178. Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Prelimi-
nary Injunction and in Response to Defendants' First Amendment Argument at 10-11, Jean
v. Nelson, No. 82-5772 (11th Cir. Apr. 12, 1983).
179. The Haitians argued that they had been denied systematically "access to attor-
neys, particularly those of HRC, both before and after the filing of G-28 forms, which serve
as a Notice of Appearance in immigration proceedings." Brief for Appellees/Cross-Appel-
lants at 64, Jean v. Nelson, No. 82-5772 (11th Cir. Apr. 12, 1983).
Access is denied during weekends, evening hours, meal hours, visiting hours,
whenever aliens are moved, and after sundown .... Appellants transferred Hai-
tians to remote areas which lacked interpreters and attorneys, making no effort
to determine whether they had counsel or relatives in Miami. Appellants consist-
ently denied telephone access to and by refugees of many of the detention facili-
ties so that refugees could not contact attorneys, relatives and other individuals,
and HRC and other civil liberties organizations could not solicit clients.
Id. at 66-67.
180. 544 F. Supp. at 1005 n.2.
19821 1033
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
certain circumstances and because the INS had not abandoned its
detention policy, the claims were not moot.' The court, therefore
proceeded to the merits.
A. Access to the Haitians
The appellate court sustained the HRC's "purely legal claim
of a right to solicit clients in detention.' 8 2 Relying on two Su-
preme Court cases, In re Primus s and NAACP v. Button,"'4 the
Eleventh Circuit stressed that the HRC-the "politically active
representative of the Haitian community"185-may inform clients
and prospective clients of their legal rights when it does so as "an
exercise of political speech unaccompanied by expectation of
remuneration."186
181. Slip op. at 2831. See supra note 107.
182. Slip op. at 2832.
183. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
184. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
185. Slip op. at 2832.
Ample evidence supports HRC's role as a politically active representative of the
Haitian community (citations omitted). Evidence also shows that absent HRC's
assistance many of the refugee class members would never have been informed
of important statutory rights accorded them by Congress. Consequently, we up-
hold the efforts of HRC in this regard.
Id.
186. Id. In NAACP v. Button, the Supreme Court held that the activities of the
NAACP, its affiliates, and its legal staff were "modes of expression and association protected
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments." 371 U.S. at 428-29. These activities included the
solicitation of prospective litigants for the purpose of furthering their civil rights objectives.
The NAACP had argued that Virginia statutes prohibiting solicitation of legal business in-
fringed their right to associate with and advise persons who seek legal redress for infringe-
ments of their rights. The Court affirmed the NAACP's right to "engage in association for
the advancement of beliefs and ideas." Id. at 430.
In the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of resolv-
ing private differences; it is a means for achieving the lawful objectives of equal-
ity of treatment by all governments, federal, state and local .... It is thus a
form of political expression.
Id. at 429.
In In re Primus, a part-time American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) attorney sought to
"further political and ideological goals through associational activity, including litigation."
436 U.S. at 414. The attorney had written a letter asking a woman who had been sterilized
whether she wanted to sue the doctor who had participated in a program that sterilized or
threatened to sterilize women as a condition of their continued receipt of medical assistance
under the Medicaid program. The attorney's actions were "undertaken to express personal
political beliefs and to advance the civil-liberties objectives of the ACLU, rather than to
derive financial gain." Id. at 422.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina found the ACLU attorney engaged in unethical
conduct because she had solicited a client for a non-profit organization, "which, as its pri-
mary purpose, renders legal services." Id. at 427. It rejected the attorney's first amendment
argument by attempting to distinguish her case from the NAACP's case in Button:
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Unfortunately, the Eleventh Circuit's analysis of the detain-
ees' right of access claim is confusing and its findings are ambigu-
ous. Confusion crept into the opinion because the court attempted
to distinguish and analyze separately the claims of the HRC and
the detained Haitians. Yet throughout its analysis, the court inad-
vertently referred to "plaintiff's" rights and "plaintiffs'" rights in-
terchangeably,' 7 thereby obfuscating many definitive statements
regarding the detainees' first amendment rights.
B. The Haitians' Rights of Access
Although the court found "merit" in the detained Haitians'
first amendment claims, intimating that the Haitians have first
amendment rights, 8 it failed to conclude expressly whether these
rights are rights independent of the HRC or whether they are re-
ciprocal rights derived from the HRC's right to gather and disperse
information. The appellate court, citing Cruz v. Beto,15' a Fifth
Circuit decision, strongly suggested the Haitians have reciprocal
rights of access. The court had established in Cruz that "certain
rights of mutual access exist between prisoners and counsel." 190
"Whereas the NAACP in that case was primarily a political organization that used litigation
as an adjunct to the overriding political aims of the organization, the ACLU has as one of its
primary purposes the rendition of legal services." Id. (original quotation marks omitted).
The United States Supreme Court reversed: "For the ACLU, as for the NAACP, 'litigation
is not a technique of resolving private differences'; it is 'a form of political expression' and
'political association.'" Id. at 428. "The First and Fourteenth Amendments require a mea-
sure of protection for 'advocating lawful means of vindicating legal rights,' (citation omit-
ted) including 'advis[ing] another that his legal rights have been infringed and refer[ring]
him to a particular attorney or group of attorneys . . .for assistance.'" Id. at 432.
In Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 531 (S.D. Fla. 1980), aff'd as
modified, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982), HRC representatives were excluded from the room
where Haitians awaited their asylum interviews. The HRC alleged this violated its first
amendment rights and the rights of its members. The court concluded: "There is simply no
justification for the continuing abuse of the Haitian Refugee Center's first amendment
rights." Id. at 532.
187. Slip op. at 2831-32.
188. Id. at 2832.
189. 603 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1979).
190. Slip op. at 2832. In Cruz, the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's order en-
joining a prison official from banning an attorney's communications with clients and poten-
tial clients who were imprisoned.
The district court concluded that the prisoners' first and fourteenth amend-
ment rights had been violated by the unreasonable limitations on their right to
access to the courts, [and] their right to receive effective legal assistance from
the attorney of their choice .... Furthermore, it found that the arbitrary bar-
ring of attorney Cruz from communicating with her clients contravened her first
and fourteenth amendment rights to practice her profession.
603 F.2d at 1181.
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The court should have expressed more clearly whether Hai-
tians have first amendment rights independent of the HRC. Be-
cause the Eleventh Circuit found that the detained Haitians have
fifth amendment rights, it follows that they also should possess
first amendment rights. Without the right of access to attorneys,
the detained Haitains' fifth amendment rights would be
meaningless.191
Once it determined that the HRC and the detained Haitians'
first amendment claims were not moot, the Eleventh Circuit, "[i]n
the interest of judicial economy,' e2 directed the district court on
remand to review the INS's access guidelines.' es The court agreed
with the INS that "regulation of aliens in detention is analogous to
regulation in the prison context."' 94 The Eleventh Circuit noted
the guidelines "appear overly restrictive,"' 95 and instructed the
district court on remand to balance the INS's "interest in deten-
tion and security against the plaintiffs' first amendment rights."'"
Security concerns at prisons merit restrictive guidelines for visi-
tors. The Haitians argued that their first amendment rights are
191. See supra text accompanying note 1. The Haitians' argument on this issue is
correct:
Aliens are protected by the Bill of Rights provisions of the Constitution. Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). Thus, they receive the protection of the
First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment due process clause, and the Fourteenth
Amendment due process and equal protection clauses. Wong Wing v. United
States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) .... J. NOWACK, [sic] R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,
Constitutional Law, 589 (1978).
Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Brief and Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Jean v.
Nelson, No. 82-5772, slip op. at 2770 (11th Cir. Apr. 12, 1983).
192. Slip op. at 2832.
193. The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the INS that immediate injunctive relief was
inappropriate because it believed it lacked a sufficient factual record describing when and
how the INS denied access between the HRC and the detainees. Id. at 2831. "[T]his case
does not involve an absolute denial of access, nor does it involve rules we can hold facially
impermissible without knowledge of countervailing circumstances." Id. The HRC denied
that the record was insufficient and argued that regardless of the record, the INS guidelines
were facially invalid under the strict requirements of the first amendment because "they
grant INS officials unreviewable and unbridled discretion to deny access on mere whim or
caprice, personal dislike or prejudice." Brief for Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 65, Jean v.
Nelson, No. 82-5772 (11th Cir. Apr. 12, 1983).
194. Slip op. at 2831-32. But the court also recognized the differences between the de-
tained Haitians and prisoners: "The analogy serves its purpose insofar as concerns for secur-
ity weigh in the balancing process. We limit our holding on this narrow point; there are
obvious differences between temporary detention of innocent aliens and the incarceration of
convicted felons." Id. at 2832.
195. Id. at 2832 n.61.
196. Id. at 2832.
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subject only to reasonable time, manner, and place restrictions.197
Political expressions and associations may be regulated only when
there is a compelling interest to do so and there are no less restric-
tive alternatives.1 98
The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that first amendment
rights run between the HRC and the detained Haitians. The court
did not expressly conclude that the detainees have their own first
amendment rights of access; implicitly, the court reached that con-
clusion. Nevertheless, the district court, on remand, cannot uphold
guidelines that unduly restrict the detainees' access rights. To do
so would infringe on the HRC's right of political expression. The
Eleventh Circuit has acknowledged the rights; the district court
must provide the requisite protection.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Miami, Florida, 1983. Two years have passed since the INS
first began incarcerating Haitians who arrived in Florida. INS's
mass detentions represented a return to a policy that was abol-
ished twenty-nine years ago as "inhumane and unnecessary."199 Al-
though District Court Judge Spellman ordered their release on
June 29, 1982, it was only a technical victory for the Haitians. The
district court did not find any substantive illegality in the INS's
new detention policy; it held the policy was invalid because it was
improperly promulgated. By July 1982, INS had remedied the
technical flaws in its detention policy.""
Consequently, the Haitians did not achieve vindication of
their constitutional rights until the second anniversary of their ar-
rival in the United States. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
held what the district court chose not to hold: the United States
government intentionally discriminated against the Haitian alieng
on the bases of race and national origin. If the Eleventh Circuit
had not ruled that the government engaged in "a stark pattern of
discrimination, '"20 1 then the Haitians would have been returned
197. See generally In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 438.
198. Id. at 424.
199. Slip op. at 2786.
200. To ensure that the technically sound detention policy would not translate into the
immediate re-incarceration of the Haitians, the Eleventh Circuit expressly directed Judge
Spellman to issue "an injunction against discriminatory enforcement of the new policy." Id.
at 2833; see supra note 107.
201. Slip op. at 2807.
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once again to the Krome Avenue detention facility.20 2
This case cannot be viewed dispassionately. Most Americans
are descendants of immigrants who fortuitously arrived prior to
1981. Those immigrants believed, and they found, that the United
States government would respect their individual rights. The Hai-
tian immigrants suffered oppression and discrimination that was
mandated by the United States government. The Krome Avenue
detention facility did "create an appearance of 'concentration
camps' filled largely by blacks. 20 3
JEFFREY C. GILBERT
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202. The Krome Avenue detention facility remains open, its barbed-wire fences still
erect. In April 1983, approximately 400 aliens-including 130 Haitians-were detained
there. Rieder, Haitians and the Court, The Miami Herald, Apr. 17, 1983, at 1E, col. 5.
203. Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. at 980 n.19 (quoting Plaintiff's Exhibit 4 at 8, Mem-
orandum of the Attorney General to the President, analyzing the proposed detention
policy).
* The authors thank Perry I. Cone, Judith Kenney, and Thomas E. Streit for their
invaluable contributions to this article.
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